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ABSTRACT 
 In a historic decision on 23 June 2016, a majority of those voting in a referendum 
as to whether the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union or leave chose 
withdrawal. The process of British withdrawal from the EU, popularly known as Brexit, 
has defense and security ramifications. While Brexit has not changed the composition or 
activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU-specific collective 
security and defense institutions face significant changes, largely unstudied, when Britain 
becomes a “third country” vis-à-vis the EU. This thesis analyzes alternative options for 
the post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense relationship. After assessing several models, 
it concludes that the most advantageous option for the UK is to establish bilateral, 
trilateral, or multilateral relations with privileged EU member states while also 
supporting close and extensive EU-NATO cooperation. 
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I. BRITAIN’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS  
This thesis asks: What are the options for the United Kingdom (UK) and European 
Union (EU) for security and defense partnership once the so-called Brexit—Britain’s 
departure from the EU—takes effect? Following a 2016 referendum, the UK left the EU on 29 
March 2019. As of this writing, no formal agreement exists, regulating the myriad relationships 
between the UK and the EU after Brexit becomes final at the end of this year—not even in such a 
pressing sector as collective security and defense. The UK has indicated that it wants to maintain 
defense and security cooperation with the EU after Brexit, but little scholarship or expert analysis 
has parsed how such an arrangement might proceed.1 The Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP), formed the pre-Brexit framework with Britain as a full member, but the other 
available status—“third country”—with its limited influence and subordinate role, is unlikely to 
appeal to the UK. Therefore, allowing the UK to secure greater decision-making influence 
and control of missions than is normally granted to third-country participation is essential 
for a future CSDP partnership. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
There is uncertainty regarding the likely impacts of Brexit on both the UK and EU 
defense and security institutions. There are questions about Britain’s possible future 
contributions to EU defense and security missions and initiatives, as well as the ability of 
the EU to provide military support in the absence of UK military capabilities. The 
uncertainty extends to NATO, where some Allies are wondering whether Brexit signals a 
wider strategic retreat by the UK. It is clear that the UK’s withdrawal from the defense and 
security structures of the EU has not been a central feature in the Brexit negotiations thus 
far. This thesis explores this gap. 
 
1 Patrick Wintour, “UK Offers to Maintain Defence and Security Cooperation with EU,” Guardian, 
September 12, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/12/uk-offers-to-maintain-defence-and-
security-cooperation-with-eu-michael-fallon. 
2 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The overall objective of this literature review is to shed light on the possible 
implications of Brexit in the under-researched area of security and defense. A brief view 
of publications shows that scholarly views are still far from any kind of consensus. On the 
one hand, experts argue that Brexit will not have major negative security and defense 
repercussions, especially in the short term. Richard Whitman argues, for example,  
that security and defense is an area in which the impact of a vote to leave 
the EU would be relatively marginal. Because cooperation in this area is 
intergovernmental, disentangling the UK would be relatively 
straightforward. And because of the limited impact that EU policies have 
achieved in this area, it is an open question as to whether Britain’s global 
role would suffer, unduly as a result.2  
On the other hand, scholars are also skeptical about any net security benefit for 
either Britain or the EU after Brexit. As Nigel Inkster concludes, “It is hard to identify any 
significant security advantage that the UK would derive from leaving the EU.”3  
Keohane et al. discuss the uncertainties of the EU’s future after Brexit by 
exemplifying security crises, including Donald Trump’s presidency, unpredictable Russia, 
terrorism, and migration flow.4 They argue that these threats could not be undertaken alone 
and Europe needs allies for support especially in the burdening of militaristic aspects.5 
Thus, they stress the vital need for Germany, France, and the UK’s cooperation on post-
Brexit European security and defense.6 In a similar view, Martill and Sus point out that 
since both the EU and the UK have matched capabilities and the current international 
environment includes several threats for each side, developing Post-Brexit security and 
 
2 Richard G. Whitman, “Brexit or Bremain: What Future for the UK’s European Diplomatic 
Strategy?” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 509–29. 
3 Nigel Inkster, “Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism,” Survival 58, no. 3 (May 3, 2016): 29, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974. 
4 Daniel Keohane, “Brexit and European Insecurity,” in Strategic Trends 2017, ed. Oliver Thränert 
and Martin Zapfe (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2017), 55. 
5 Keohane, “Brexit and European Insecurity.” 
6 Keohane. 
3 
defense policies are their particular interest.7 Yet, establishing a new security and defense 
partnership will depend on several factors. For example, the EU should choose whether to 
slow down its further integration or not, and how it will determine the differentiated access 
to third countries and member states.8 Thus, the process must answer broader questions in 
terms of reciprocity of interests and the possibility of different institutional agreements.  
Bakker argues it is clear that in numbers of capabilities, knowledge, experience, 
and resources the EU will suffer in defense; however, it has to be kept in mind that the UK 
“is leaving the EU, not Europe,”9 and that these capabilities will still be available to 
European security in NATO and coalitions-of-the-willing contexts.10 On the contrary, 
Calcara sees Brexit as a win-win situation for the EU and the UK.11 From Calcara’s point 
of view, the defense-industrial partnership of the EU and the UK not need to be damaged.12 
Also, Brexit may force the EU to take major steps to increase armaments cooperation, and 
these steps will eventually lead to enhancing EU defense expenditures and may result in 
spillover impact in the UK.13 Lain and Nouwens examine the consequences of Brexit on 
European security and defense and stress the UK’s major contributions to European 
security, especially in counterterrorism through the CSDP.14 In terms of the UK’s 
contributions to CSDP missions and operations, they assert that if the UK withdraws from 
the European security structures after CSDP, both the EU and the UK lose enormously in 
 
7 Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, “Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 
‘French Connection’?,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 4 (November 
2018): 848, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118796979. 
8 Martill and Sus, “Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation.” 
9 Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee, European Defence: How to Engage the UK after 
Brexit? (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, 2017), 22, 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf. 
10 Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, 27. 
11 Antonio Calcara, “Brexit: What Impact on Armaments Cooperation?,” Global Affairs 3, no. 2 
(March 15, 2017): 10, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1342555. 
12 Calcara, “Brexit.” 
13 Calcara. 
14 Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens, “The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and 
Security,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017, 6. 
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terms of defense capabilities and global prestige.15 Thus, they advocate sustained 
cooperation in post-Brexit between these two parties as long as they share a mutual interest 
in securing European borders and citizens.16 Therefore, it is in the interest of both parties 
to find formulas as to how the UK can be engaged in European defense and CSDP after 
Brexit.17  
Major and Mölling examine Brexit in two ways.18 On the one hand, Brexit will 
consume governmental energy in domestic conflicts and in bargaining between the 
remaining member states. On the other hand, Brexit will be a positive catalyzer to 
regenerate CSDP.19 Correspondingly, Turpin also considers Brexit as “a potential catalyst 
for a renewed UK-EU defense relationship.”20 He argues the UK’s involvement in 
European security and defense cooperation will be conditional in terms of domestic 
pressures.21 Blagden addresses that in a complex domestic and international system that 
includes social, political, and economic drawbacks, “the interaction effects of seeking 
Britain’s extraction from the EU will be numerous, bitterly contested, and often 
unexpected.”22  
Black et al. also mention the future security and defense relations between the EU 
and the UK after Brexit, and they argue both parties would have an interest in multinational 
military cooperation for their mutual political and operational advantages.23 They outline 
 
15 Lain and Nouwens, “The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security,” 2017. 
16 Lain and Nouwens. 
17 Lain and Nouwens. 
18 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “Brexit, Security and Defence: A Political Problem, Not a 
Military One,” UI Brief, no. 3 (May 2017): 3. 
19 Major and Mölling, 14. 
20 Lee D Turpin, “The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist 
Approach” (ECPR General Conference 2018, Hamburg, Germany, 201822-25 August), 25. 
21 Turpin, 37. 
22 David Blagden, “Britain and the World after Brexit,” International Politics 54, no. 1 (January 
2017): 25, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0015-2. 
23 James Black et al., “Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of 
the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU -- Overview Report” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1786.1. 
5 
the future arrangements by which the UK could continue to involve in the CSDP as a non-
member state such as Norway and Turkey, and suggest the UK might negotiate a new 
arrangement for its case by case involvement in CSDP missions/operations.24 On the other 
hand, the UK might be disengaged from the security and defense activities and cut its 
contributions in several areas including battlegroup roster, Operational Headquarters, or 
maritime assets in the Mediterranean. Cutting its contributions would result in an enhanced 
contribution by the remaining EU states, or a reduction in CSDP capabilities.25 Dalay 
signifies that Brexit would serve as a template for Turkey as the EU and the UK negotiate 
a new deal for the aim of forming a new relationship. He summarizes: 
The regional reshuffling created by Brexit provides new incentives for 
Turkey and the EU to contemplate alternative arrangements and overcome 
the anxieties and expectations created by the long-defunct and largely 
illusory membership process.26 
Black et al. conjecture that even if the UK continues its involvement on a case-by-
case basis, the EU’s defense capabilities will be undermined seriously after the loss of the 
UK’s military capabilities.27 Also, they deliberate on the EU’s actorness and the credibility 
of the CSDP by arguing that the Brexit vote could be a sign of political division within the 
EU.28 The uncertainties that occurred after the Brexit vote might curtail the decision-
making processes with increasing caution among EU states, and the economic decline due 
to Brexit could lead to a fall in defense budgets and abandonment of the 2-percent pledge 
on defense by the EU member states.29 Martill and Sus claim that since the EU is resistant 
to give the UK a strong role in defining security policy, the most possible options for the 
future security and defense partnership are either a cooperation of the UK with NATO and 
 
24 Black et al., 68. 
25 Black et al., 69. 
26 Gallip Dalay, Turkey and Europe after Brexit: Looking beyond EU Membership (Doha: Al Jazeera 
Centre for Studies, 2016), 2. 
27 Black et al., “Defence and Security after Brexit,” 26. 
28 Black et al., “Defence and Security after Brexit.” 
29 Black et al. 
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the CSDP-Plus, or cooperation with the French bilaterally.30 Dumoulin states that after 
Brexit, the UK’s relations with the EU and the U.S. might be affected, and also there could 
be a potential change in the European continent’s landscape since the UK and the EU share 
a common history, geography, and culture.31 He also warns about the consequences of 
Brexit in terms of their potential effects for both parties, and he argues that since both 
parties need each other, Brexit might open a door to create a better vision for the EU’s 
foreign and security policies.32 In a similar perspective, Dumoulin, Keohane et al. point 
out that the Brexit vote allows the EU to rethink its security and defense policies. In that 
regard, they illustrate the attempts of Berlin and Paris to strengthen common defense 
policies after the Brexit vote.33 Oliver and Williams examine Brexit in terms of the 
relations between the EU-US and the UK-US.34 They argue that the Brexit decision would 
not serve as a good outcome for the U.S., and they add that  
Some British Eurosceptics might dream of Britain becoming a North 
Atlantic Singapore or a ‘Switzerland with nukes’, neglecting the fact that 
Singapore and Switzerland play minor roles in regional politics and are 
ultimately subject to regional politics rather than shapers of it.35 
While some scholars take an optimistic view about the effects of Brexit votes, some 
are pessimistic about it. McBride discusses the UK’s hesitant relationship with the EU by 
stressing the UK’s opt-outs from central EU policies such as common currency and the 
Schengen area.36 With the increasing Euroscepticism, Brexit supporters reclaimed their 
national sovereignty and believed that the UK should deal with immigration by freeing 
 
30 Martill and Sus, “Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation,” 849. 
31 André Dumoulin, “Brexit and European Defence: An In-Depth Analysis,” Centre for Security and 
Defence Studies, June 8, 2016, 2, http://www.irsd.be/website/images/livres/enotes/20.pdf. 
32 Dumoulin, 4–5. 
33 Daniel Keohane and et.al, Brexit and European Insecurity. In Strategic Trends 2017. Zurich: Center 
for Security Studies., 2017,p.57   
34 Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, “Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the 
US-EU and US-UK Relationships,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 41, https://doi.org/10.1111/
1468-2346.12606. 
35 Oliver and Williams, “Special Relationships in Flux.” 




itself from EU regulations. He argues that Brexit intimidates the EU’s desires for a common 
security and defense policy.37 Bew and Elefteriu deliberate on the UK’s important 
advantage of its role in shaping events for its benefit and global image. The success of 
Brexit will be linked to the UK’s deliberations on its global role in world affairs, especially 
in the following five years.38 
C. ASSUMPTIONS  
In light of the literature review, the first assumption of this thesis is that the UK is 
one of the two most capable security and defense actors in the EU, which ensures a special 
partnership between the UK and the EU after Brexit. To this end, the thesis analyzes the 
British government’s decision to push for a special partnership in matters of security and 
defense in the early phases of the Brexit negotiations. The UK’s offers unique contributions 
to European security and defense as well as the common interests between the UK and the 
EU. The primary method of research used to analyze this assumption will be the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Some analysts have suggested that Brexit could 
allow the EU to move ahead more easily with developing shared capabilities and 
undertaking military integration projects under the EU’s CSDP. 
The second assumption suggests the UK is one of the most reluctant supporters of 
EU defense integration; thus, Brexit will facilitate increasing defense cooperation in the 
EU. To this end, this thesis analyzes whether Brexit offers an opportunity and potential 
means for increased defense integration. The accuracy of this assumption is determined by 
an analysis of the expressed predictions for the future of EU defense, military capability, 
political influence, and economic strength. These predictions emerged in the ongoing 
debate following the referendum.  
The final assumption is that the most important European defense organization is 
NATO. Therefore, Brexit hardly affects European defense. To this end, nothing since the 
end of the referendum has occurred that would question the role of NATO as both UK’s 
 
37 McBride, “The Debate over ‘Brexit.’” 
38 John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit, Policy 
Exchange, 2016, p.2   
8 
and Europe’s premier defense organization, at least in the narrow sense of territorial 
defense. The type of material used to analyze this assumption will be the Strategic Defense 
and Security Review 2015.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In view of the security and defense partnership of the EU and the UK, the thesis 
considers the history and prospects of EU-UK cooperation in defense and security matters 
in the new Brexit context. It does so by first examining a brief history of the CSDP and the 
structures and institutions that help enforce the policy making decisions. Then, it identifies 
the UK’s position in the CSDP and the relationship between the EU and the UK. Next, it 
offers an analysis of the major issues requiring a solution in order for the UK to continue 
participation in the CSDP after Brexit. A close cooperation between the EU and the UK 
will largely depend on future negotiations and the EU’s willingness to improve current 
CSDP frameworks. Lastly, this thesis explores possible effects of Brexit on the future 
security and defense relationship and provides recommendations for a partnership between 
the EU and the UK.  
It does so by offering three potential models for a post-Brexit security and defense 
partnership: Civilian Power Europe, Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), or the UK 
as an Integrated Actor Model. These models are derived from the application of parallel 
agreements involving the Membership of the EEA, Membership of the European Free 
Trade Association, and the Free Trade Agreement. These options are assessed on their 
ability to provide the best option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship.  
Throughout this analysis, this thesis relies on qualitative assessments of the 
information provided in published sources, including primary sources such as official 
publications by the UK and the EU, and such secondary sources as analyses by scholars 
and well-informed journalists. Sources published in the framework of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are used in analyzing the defense integration of the 
EU. These sources provide information on development of the defense capabilities and 
cooperation of the European Union countries, as well as strengthening the defense industry.  
9 
The UK’s Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015. provides a baseline of 
British policy before the referendum.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter provides a general 
outlook of the thesis. It includes the purpose and delimitation of the thesis, research 
questions, literature review, and research methodology.  
Chapter II briefly analyzes the CSDP and what structures it contains, and provides 
suggestions that would allow the UK to continue to participate in the CSDP after Brexit.  
Chapter III assess the UK’s stance on a future CSDP partnership and identifies the 
challenges from the UK’s demands when considering an EU-UK CSDP partnership post-
Brexit.  
Chapter IV offers alternative models and provides recommendations for 
establishing a post-Brexit security and defense partnership. 
Chapter V, the conclusion, draws the results together to establish the security and 
defense implications for the UK leaving the EU and offers insight into how the security 
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II. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY  
This chapter focuses on the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP), and the possible suggestions that would allow the UK to continue to participate in 
CSDP after Brexit. It starts with the history of the Common Security and Defense Policy. It 
continues with a detailed analysis of CSDP structures and institutions, including the history 
of operations and decision-making strategy within the CSDP. Relations within the CSDP are 
divided into two sub-sections on, respectively, the UK’s position in the CSDP and the 
relationship between the UK and the EU. First and foremost, even though the UK is Europe’s 
largest defense spender, technologically advanced, and equipped with global connections 
arguably exceeding those of any EU Member State, the UK was scaling down its 
involvement in the CSDP before Brexit.39  
A. BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CSDP 
Since its establishment, the EU has developed as an international crisis management 
actor.” Since 2003 the EU has conducted more than 25 civilian and military crisis 
management missions in the world during (dated to 2003 – 2013).40 In light of the “EU’s 
historical evolution, starting as a peace project based on economic integration in the 1950s, 
the development of the EU as an international crisis management and military actor is quite 
exceptional.” An example of its evolution is the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which focuses on peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international 
security.41 However, as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the CSDP 
has advanced into a stand-alone policy field with its own rules, procedures, and bodies.”42 
 
39 Black et al., “Defence and Security after Brexit.” 
40  Julia Schmidt, “Panos Koutrakos. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy,” European 
Journal of International Law, Book Review, 24, no. 4 (1260): 1257, https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/ejil/cht075.  
41 Member States, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” EUR-Lex, 2012, 34, 
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The reformed CSDP, originally launched as the ESDP in 1999, has been further 
developed based on the European Security Strategy (ESS), which grew out of the sharp 
divisions among EU member states on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ESS 
identifies strategic objectives to defend the EU’s security and to promote its values. “In an 
era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand... 
The first line of defense will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic... Conflict 
prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.”43 According to the ESS,  “US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance 
internal cohesion at EU level.”44 
The CSDP has two main objectives. First, it is meant to establish a capacity to 
respond to crises in the European neighborhood and beyond, based on the extended 
Petersberg Tasks, which cover joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping, as well as tasks of combat forces in crisis management. 
Second, it is meant to ensure that a member state is equipped with the necessary civilian and 
military capabilities to execute the Petersberg tasks in the context of an operation.45 
B. STRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND MEMBERSHIP 
The two main structures of the CSDP are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC is a preparatory body for 
the Council of the EU, made up of ambassadors from the EU member states. It keeps track 
of the international situation and helps to define policies within the CSDP; the committee 
also prepares EU responses to crises. The EUMC which is a body composed of the Chiefs of 
Defense of the Member States, the so-called permanent military representatives. This 
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45 Tuomas Iso-Markku, “Europe’s Changing Security Landscape: What Role Will the EU Play in 
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military body provides the PSC with recommendations and advice on military matters within 
the EU.46  
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was implemented, which further centralized many 
executive functions in the EU, a new structure was introduced to the CSDP: Permanent 
Structured Cooperation. “This mechanism can be used for capability development between 
member states within the framework of the EU. At the same time, the position of the High 
Representative has been strengthened, making it the chair of the Council of Ministers on 
foreign and security policy.”47  
Participation in the CSDP can be direct (as an EU member state) and indirect (through 
third countries’ involvement). Indirect participation in the CSDP mainly occurs through 
forming a Framework Participation Agreement for CSDP missions and operations in general. 
Second, third countries can join the CSDP mission and operations by concluding  a 
Participation Agreement for a specific mission or operation.48 This latter approach also 
includes participation through the Berlin Plus arrangements and letters of exchange since 
these tools are used for missions or operations on a case-by-case basis. Article 42 of the 
Treaty on the European Union provides that the CSDP “shall provide the Union with an 
operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets... the Union may use them on 
missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.’’49 
Among CSDP missions, the EU refers to civilian CSDP activities, while operations concern 
military CSDP activities. Missions and operations are also discussed by, Thierry Tardy, who 
indicates that ‘‘In EU parlance, CSDP military activities are called operations while civilian 
activities are called missions.”50 
 
46 European Union External Action Service, “Common Security and Defence Policy.”.  
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In EU jargon, a third country can be defined as a country that is not a member of the 
European Union. Consequently, after Brexit, the UK falls within the scope of this definition. 
Furthermore, participation in the CSDP by third countries has been measured by acceptance 
of either a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, concluding  a 
Participation Agreement (PA), or  an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters in 
conjunction with  the Berlin Plus arrangements. These options provide the political and legal 
foundation of outside cooperation in the CSDP.51 
C. HISTORY, OPERATIONS, AND DECISION MAKING 
In 2013, the European Council expressed three major priorities of the CSDP: 
“increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of common security and defense policy 
(CSDP); the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe’s defense industry.”52 
After that, the European Parliament (EP) tried to encourage EU member states to make 
progress on managing capability resources effectively. The “EP resolution of 2017” 
expressed the need for further development of EU military and civilian capabilities. Thus, 
the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established to command 
missions, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) was created for 
compatibility of defense spending. According to Giovanni Faleg, “efforts by EU member 
states in the wake of St Malo (December 1998) and Cologne (June 1999) have resulted in 
the creation of Brussels-based bureaucracies. To manage the CSDP, permanent structures 
have been established since the Helsinki Council in 1999 through the outlines of Council 
documents and strategic guidelines provided by the European Security Strategy.”53  
According to the European Union External Action Service’s factsheet, since 2003, 
the CSDP has launched 34 missions and operations in an extensive range of geographical 
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areas.54 Therefore, CSDP missions and operations could be regarded as the EU’s collective 
effort to enhance its security and defense, and also it is a part of an international security 
arena that is changing rapidly.55 As Tardy states, “CSDP missions and operations, therefore, 
need to be seen and evaluated as both a key component of EU efforts in the field of security 
and defense.”56 As Figure 1 reveals, both the civilian missions and military operations of 
CSDP have represented an increasing trend over the years; however, the number of civilian 
missions has outweighed the number of military actions.  
 
Figure 1. Active EU operations and missions per year57 
 
54 “EU Missions and Operations As Part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),” 
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The goals of CSDP missions and operations can be analyzed from Figure 2. The 
security goal of CSDP missions and operations increased dramatically between 2011 and 
2015. Also, the training goal was enhanced from 2014 to 2016. In comparing the security 
and training goals, the figure reveals that monitoring, border control, and reforming policy 
goals remained stable between 2015 and 2017. 
 
Figure 2. Trend of active CSDP missions and operations by a goal58 
The European Defense Agency (EDA), which was established by the Council of 
Defense Ministers in 2004, is one of the key components of CSDP. It manages crises and 
boosts the EU’s defense capabilities. While CSDP participating countries create a common 
defense policy, it is largely dependent on the national capabilities of EU member states. 
Unanimity is needed in the Council’s decision-making processes to participate in military 
engagements.59  
 
58 Adapted from diMauro and Wright. 
59 Zsuzsanna Csornai, Evaluating the Effects of Brexit on the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 5. 
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The CSDP has since the 2000s evolved with new planning capabilities, structures, and 
procedures, based on operational experience with 34 missions and operations. Nevertheless, 
establishing CSDP operations has faced difficulties in the areas of force generation, common 
financing, enablers, intelligence, and logistics.60 Also, the CSDP continues to be heavily 
dependent on the most capable member states and its institutions.61  
Overall, the purpose of the CSDP does not point in a clear direction. The CSDP has 
never had a clearly defined strategy by which its actions have been guided; in reality, the 
CSDP has consisted of individual missions and operations launched on a case-by-case basis. 
The establishment of the CSDP has been characterized as a bottom-up project, executing 
separate missions and operations as it developed in response to events, without pursuing a 
common strategy. This is a reflection of the CSDP objective, which states that the EU should 
respond to crisis, thereby not establishing a comprehensive strategy. The effectiveness of the 
strategy is, therefore, slightly fragmented. The lack of a clearly defined strategy already 
suggests that the CSDP’s effectiveness is not optimized. 
The main drivers behind EU integration include economic, monetary, and fiscal 
factors. Integration among EU member states in economic matters, took place at a rapid pace, 
while the security realm seems to have evolved at a slower pace.62 The emergence of the 
CSDP can be credited in part to EU integration in other areas. When integration takes place 
in one area, this is likely to spill-over to other areas as well. The CSDP consists of a bottom-
up approach.63 That is, a common defense strategy has been built up by undertaking missions 
and operations following the capabilities requirements and developments in the last decade 
without relying on a so-called ‘grand strategy’. Missions and operations are gradually 
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developing, instead of relying fully on an existing strategy. Engaging in different missions 
and operations is expected to guide the EU towards a common CSDP strategy. In contrast, a 
top-down approach would suggest the foundation of a clearly defined common strategy, by 
which all missions and operations are guided with an overarching aim. Yet, the political 
implications may be much greater because Brexit requires a reconsideration of the governance 
model of the CSDP, which was created through a Franco-British summit. Hence, the UK was 
one of the main EU Member States driving the CSDP.64 
To draw any substantial conclusions on if and how the UK will be able to continue 
taking part in the CSDP after Brexit requires an overview of EU-UK CSDP relationships 
before Brexit. The assumption is that past cooperation could provide information about 
behavior in future partnerships. In the initiation of the CSDP, the UK took an early leading 
role. In 1998, the Anglo-French summit led to an agreement between Tony Blair and Jacques 
Chirac to push for greater EU defense capabilities. These two countries, the strongest military 
powers in the EU, formed the starting point of what was soon to become the CSDP. 
D. THE UK’S POSITION IN THE CSDP 
Worré divides the UK’s role in European defense since World War II into three 
stages.65 The first period was between 1947 and 1969. In this period, the United Kingdom 
focused on establishing mutual relations with the United States and making decisions with the 
support of the American ally. This strategy resulted in tensions in Europe, specifically with 
France, particularly in the 1960s when President de Gaulle undertook France’s withdrawal 
from NATO’s integrated military command structure. The second period occurred between 
1970 and 1990. During this period of West-East dialogue and confrontation in the Cold War 
Britain decided to take part in several defense cooperation organizations in line with its 
national interests. The third period, which took place between 1991 and 2013, was defined by 
Worré as opposition to European integration initiatives. The British-French St Malo initiative 
in December 1998 was, to be sure, an important exception to Worré’s observation. In other 
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words, Britain would support only programs or initiatives that offered clear benefits to it.66 
Now, bilateral relations between the EU and the UK are going through a fourth stage which 
was defined by the Brexit vote.  
Figure 3 shows that the UK has been behind large EU countries, including France and 
Germany, when it comes to taking designated leading roles concerning CSDP missions and 
operations.  
 
Figure 3. EU personnel contributions to CSDP missions and operations 
(2003-2014)67 
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In general, it could be argued that the UK’s relationship with the CSDP has been 
weakening in recent years. Hence, despite the UK’s early contributions to CSDP 
operations, for example during Operation Concordia, EUFOR Althea, and EUNAVFOR 
Atlanta, the UK has been decreasing its contributions to CSDP operations and missions 
and this began years before the Brexit referendum. In 2016, “the UK was the fifth-greatest 
contributor to CSDP military missions, after France, Italy, Germany, and Spain.”68 In 
terms of civilian missions, Britain scores seventh, after Germany, Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden, France, and Finland.69 According to Giovanni Faleg,70 an associate reader at the 
Center For European Policy Studies, the UK contributes 4.2% of all EU personnel to CSDP 
civilian missions. With the UK seceding from the EU, the CSDP loses modest civilian and 
military contributions and a veto player. States such as Austria and Romania, small military 
powers, have contributed more personnel to CSDP missions and operations in the past than 
has the UK.71 Therefore, the operational implications of Brexit for the CSDP could be 
considered minimal. Additionally, despite the UK’s strong military, Faleg argues that “the 
EU has traditionally avoided engagement in expeditionary and high-intensity warfare, in 
which UK capabilities and know-how might have been decisive.”72 
E. THE CSDP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND EU 
Despite the UK’s leading role in the launching and development of the EU’s CSDP, 
London has become a straggler. A comparison of the UK’s size to its CSDP contributions 
show that the UK has made relatively minor contributions to CSDP missions and 
operations. The UK has tended to prefer activities and operations utilizing NATO in the 
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past. The UK has contributed personnel to most of the EU’s Civilian CSDP missions.73 
Yet, the size of these contributions has been rather modest in comparison to the size of the 
UK. Moreover, the UK has had a limited designated leading role, which can be described 
as having “operational control or contribute the most personnel in missions with a military 
or police component.”74 Figure 4 outlines the number of designated leading roles in 2003–
2016 by the three biggest EU states: France, Germany, and the UK.75 
 
Figure 4. Number of CSDP missions and designated lead states (2003-
2016).76 
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Even though recent years have shown a decrease in UK involvement in the CSDP, 
London remains interested in continued cooperation after Brexit in CSDP missions and 
operations.77 The desire to continue to take part in the CSDP is largely political. On the 
one hand, continued UK CSDP involvement signals that the UK will continue to be a 
relevant and active security partner in Europe. Moreover, the UK’s strategic interest in the 
continuation of a safe and stable Europe will remain after Brexit.78 Indeed, participating 
in the CSDP may be crucial to the UK if it wants to stay committed to the defense and 
security of Europe.79 At the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, Theresa May 
indicated two main reasons to continue cooperation in the framework of the CSDP. First, 
the UK wants to be able to continue taking part in major European diplomatic debates. 
Besides that, the UK wants to limit the consequences of Brexit on its internal defense, 
preserving access to the market of the EU and other projects surrounding the CSDP.80 In 
this regard, May argued “that our security at home is best advanced through global 
cooperation, working with institutions that support that, including the EU.”81 
F. CONCLUSION  
European security and defense are unique within the European Union’s integration 
project. Unlike economic integration, CSDP integration within the EU is based on 
voluntary cooperation with all possibilities to keep national sovereignty when states decide 
to do so. The CSDP is therefore a cooperation framework with some issue’s worth 
mentioning. There is also a level of voluntariness in the CSDP since each mission and 
operation requires the commitment of individual member states. Due to European 
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integration in other areas, it seems that CSDP missions and operations are launched in 
regions where some EU countries have economic or geostrategic interests or historic and 
cultural ties.  
Ultimately, there is no clear direction in which the EU intends to steer the CSDP, 
except for the EU treaties and other high-level policy statements. The objectives of the 
CSDP and the legal treaty provisions lack clear guidelines as to whether a specific situation 
demands a response by the EU. However, the legal provisions can be interpreted to react 
to a situation with the CSDP when the member states find this relevant and appropriate. 
The extent of the UK’s participation in the CSDP after Brexit remains a question at 
hand. “After Brexit, the UK is to be considered as a third country.” The EU welcomes post-
Brexit British CSDP involvement due to the UK’s military weight and diplomatic 
significance. However, the UK’s call for a unique relationship that exceeds that of any 
other third country makes post-Brexit British participation in the CSDP not as 
straightforward as that of other third countries, such as Norway. In considering the EU’s 
stance towards a post-Brexit CSDP framework, the UK will not have a seat at the EU 
decision-making, i.e., it will lose its veto power.  
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III. FACTORS / ISSUES FOR POST-BREXIT COOPERATION 
This chapter identifies the major issues requiring resolution in order for the UK to 
continue its participation in the CSDP after Brexit, specifically joining missions and 
operations in the CSDP through FPAs or PAs. Current agreements within the EU limit such 
participation by the UK to that of third-country status, which presently means that the UK 
will no longer have the same decision-making influence or control of missions involving 
its forces as members of the EU. Nonetheless, the UK has sent contradictory signals 
regarding its willingness to accept such status, while also seeking a “special partnership.” 
In general, the content of existing third-country agreements differs depending on 
the respective country involved. Yet, within all current means of third country CSDP 
participation, either utilizing an FPA or PA, the EU indicates that all partners endorse the 
EU’s decision-making autonomy. In this regard, third countries are principally outside the 
decision-making procedures of the EU, meaning that they, to a great extent, must accept 
the procedures and timeline of the EU. Third countries are, therefore, often regarded as 
second-class stakeholders.82 Tardy argues that “by nature, non-member states’ 
participation in EU operations requires a certain degree of acceptance of EU practices, as 
well as a degree of subordination.”83 Third countries are invited to contribute to CSDP 
missions and operations ... at a late stage, and full access to EU documents is only accepted 
after approval by the PSC.84 Once third countries are involved in CSDP missions and 
operations, the Committee of Contributors (CoC) is set up. Even though the CoC is 
supposed to function as a forum for information exchanges between contributing third 
countries, it has a subordinate role. According to Sophia Besch, the “UK will not want to 
accept the subordinate role that the EU currently assigns to non-EU troop-contributing 
countries.”85 
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This chapter begins with the UK’s stance on a future CSDP partnership. It next 
identifies the challenges and feasibility of meeting the UK’s demands considering the 
existing agreements for a possible EU-UK CSDP partnership post-Brexit. Lastly, the 
chapter presents the EU’s stance on a post-Brexit CSDP partnership with the UK.  
A. THE UK’S STANCE ON A FUTURE CSDP PARTNERSHIP 
The UK’s stance could be characterized as a degree of willingness to enter into past 
third-country mechanisms in the EU’s CSDP. In September 2017, the British government 
published a document titled “The Foreign Policy, Defense, and Development: A Future 
Partnership Paper.”86 Within this document, the British government states:  
Given the shared values of the UK and EU partners, the capabilities we offer 
and the scale and depth of collaboration that currently exists between the 
UK and the EU in the fields of foreign policy, defence and security, and 
development, the UK seeks to develop a deep and special partnership with 
the EU that goes beyond existing third country arrangements.87 
The document goes on to indicate that the fundamental aspects of this new special 
partnership between the UK and the EU post-Brexit should include several priorities:  
1. The UK and the EU should have regular close consultations on foreign 
and security policy issues. This could include cooperation on sanctions 
listings, including by sharing information and aligning policy where 
appropriate.88 
2. The UK would like to establish how best to utilize UK assets, 
recognizing the expertise and many military and niche capabilities that 
the UK contributes to the EU’s military ‘Force Catalogue’. This 
ambitious new partnership would provide the opportunity for the UK 
and the EU to work together in CSDP missions and operations.89  
3. With this level of cooperation, the UK could work with the EU during 
mandate development and detailed operational planning. The level of 
UK involvement in the planning process should be reflective of the 
UK’s contribution. As part of this enhanced partnership, the UK could 
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offer assistance through a continued contribution to CSDP missions and 
operations, including UK personnel, expertise, assets, or use of 
established UK national command and control facilities.90  
4. As part of the deep and special partnership, the UK wants to explore 
how best to ensure that the UK and European defense and security 
industries can continue to work together to deliver the capabilities that 
we need to counter the shared threats we face, and promote our mutual 
prosperity. This could include future UK collaboration in European 
Defense Agency projects and initiatives. We could also consider options 
and models for participation in the Commission’s European Defense 
Fund including both the European Defense Research Program and the 
European Defense Industrial Development Program.91  
To realize the UK’s ambitions concerning a new CSDP partnership, Theresa May, 
then the Prime Minister, May used the phrase “creative solutions” five times in her 
Florence speech in 2017.92 Special emphasis was also given to “new thinking” and being 
“imaginative.”93 Her speech implied that the UK is particularly interested in addressing 
new means of CSDP participation post-Brexit. Similarly, the Directorate-General for 
External Policies of the European Union describes the priorities of the UK as seeking to 
“find a way of involving the United Kingdom, even partially, in the process of making 
decisions in the field of the CFSP/CSDP.”94  
Additional viewpoints on a post-Brexit UK-CSDP partnership can be found in the 
Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership document.95 This document, as the name 
suggests, focuses specifically on post-Brexit security cooperation. Instead of advocating 
involvement in the decision-making procedure, the UK softened its stance, arguing “that 
the UK wants to reach a security partnership with the EU that promotes our shared security 
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and develops our cooperation. It must respect both the decision-making autonomy of the 
European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.”96 This sentence implies that 
the UK recognizes that it will not be directly involved in the EU’s collective security and 
defense decision-making after Brexit. Nonetheless, Federico Santopinto argues that the UK 
“still hopes to be able to access and influence it.”97  
The most recent document spelling out the UK’s stance derives from “The Future 
Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union,” formalized on July 
12, 2018.98 In this document, the UK focused on five key principles regarding a future 
security relationship. First, the UK reaffirmed its commitment to respect the decision-
making autonomy of the EU.99 In contrast to Federico Santopinto, the British officials 
conceded that The “UK will play no formal role in EU decision-making and will make 
independent decisions in foreign policy, defence, and development.”100 As of this writing, 
judgements are still inconsistent.  
Another key principle of the UK calls for “an institutional framework that delivers 
a practical and flexible partnership.”101 This would mean that the UK and the EU would 
work together in the event of a crisis. To achieve such a framework, the UK made several 
propositions for a tailored partnership with the EU: 
1. consultation and regular dialogue on geographic and thematic issues and 
the global challenges the UK and the EU face;  
2. mechanisms to discuss and coordinate the implementation of existing 
and new sanctions;  
3. arrangements to enable cooperation on crisis management operations, 
including using civilian and military assets and capabilities to promote 
global peace and stability, where it is mutually beneficial;  
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4. commitments to support a collaborative and inclusive approach to 
European capability development and planning;  
5. commitments to continue to work together to address global 
development challenges, supporting a cooperative accord between the 
UK and the EU on development and external programming;  
6. continued cooperation on EU strategic space projects, including their 
secure aspects; and  
7. a Security of Information Agreement that facilitates the sharing of 
information and intelligence.102  
Recognizing that the UK and the EU share a wide range of security threats, it is 
important that the UK is proposing shared capabilities with the EU in order to have the 
greatest effect in responding to challenges. Nonetheless, the UK only mentions that 
arrangements are needed to enable cooperation in the CSDP. The specific, 
operationalizable content of these arrangements remains unclear. The UK does indicate 
that future “foreign policy, defence, and development cooperation is likely to require a 
combination of formal agreements enabling coordination on a case-by-case basis.”103 
Presumably, these agreements will be drafted with respect to the “sovereignty of the UK 
and the autonomy of the EU.”104  
Particularly when it comes to consultation and coordination between the UK and 
the EU, the UK proposes additional four principles:  
1. consultation across all foreign policy areas, with regular dialogue 
between officials, ad hoc invitations to meetings, for example to the 
Political and Security Committee in informal sessions, provisions for 
discussion between EU27 leaders and the UK Prime Minister and at 
other political levels;  
2. information and intelligence sharing, for example through the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), European Union Satellite 
Centre (SATCEN), and EU Military Staff (EUMS);  
3. reciprocal exchange of expertise and personnel in areas of mutual 
interest and collaboration, which would enable greater understanding 
between the UK and the EU and thus facilitate practical cooperation; 
and  
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4. cooperation in multilateral fora, such as the UN, G7, G20, IMF, OECD, 
OSCE and World Bank, and third countries, to enable the use of other 
foreign policy levers, including an option to agree shared positions and 
statements, joint demarches and jointly organized events, as well as 
cooperation on consular provision and protection.105  
Britain’s ambition is also shown by the statement that “no existing security 
agreement between the EU and a third country captures the full depth and breadth of our 
existing relationship.”106 The UK’s proposals are ambitious and achievable. To achieve 
these propositions, the UK argues that “Much of this can be done within existing third 
country precedents in this area.”107 Such a suggestion by the UK could be perceived as an 
inclination to accept arrangements based on previous third-country mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, the UK specifically mentions that “There are opportunities to build on 
existing precedents for third country participation in EU operations and missions, for 
example through an enhanced Framework Participation Agreement.”108 The UK 
persistently pursues mechanisms that go beyond those of other third countries due to, as 
the British government describes it, the “unprecedented nature of the UK-EU security 
relationship, given its starting point, potential scale and the shared values and interests.”109 
These types of mechanisms are essential when the EU and the UK are working closely 
together as partners around the world. 
B. CHALLENGES OF REALIZING THE UK’S DEMANDS 
Concluding an FPA allows the UK to support missions and operations by 
contributing personnel. However, it leaves no room for participation in the decision-
making process, nor power to decide if and where the EU launches an operation or mission, 
including its execution.110 Such decisions are made in the PSC, supported by the Civilian 
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Committee; the EU Military Committee; the Politico-Military Group; the Civilian 
Planning, and Conduct Capability; and the EU Military Staff. Yet, the special partnership 
with the EU that the UK is seeking regarding the CSDP will be challenging to set up. Some 
third countries, for example, Turkey and Norway, currently contribute vast numbers of 
troops to CSDP missions and operations.111 According to Federico Santopinto, Turkey and 
other third countries could be expected to demand equal treatment if the UK were to receive 
a special relationship.112 
At the very least, the UK will expect a degree of influence in the decision-making 
procedures of the CSDP.113 Yet, the European Commission’s negotiators have followed 
several red lines throughout the negotiations, many aimed at resisting the UK’s bid to 
influence the EU’s security and defense decision-making autonomy.114 The extent to 
which the UK will be able to “have representatives or permanent observers on the EU 
decision-making bodies” concerning the CSDP and CFSP, including their agencies, e.g., 
the PSC, EDA, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is, 
therefore, uncertain.115  
In addition, the European Treaties do not make any provisions for potential third-
country attendance in the work of the European Council or the Council of the EU.116 In 
other words, the UK will not have a formal voice in the security and defense realm. 
Following the Council’s and the European Council’s Rules of Procedure:  
a third state as a member of the delegation of a member of the Council 
should be ruled out, as it could be regarded by the other members of the 
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Council as a factor which could affect the decision-making autonomy of the 
Council.117  
Yet, when a session addresses matters concerning the CSDP, participation by a 
third country requires a unanimous decision of the Council of the EU. If the decision 
passes, the third country observer may give an opinion if invited by the Presidency of the 
Council, but participation in the discussions is out of the question. Additionally, the 
representative of the country concerned is obliged to leave the meeting room when 
requested.118 Concerning the European Council, similar provisions apply. According to 
Article 4.2 of the European Council’s Rules of Procedure:  
Meetings in the margins of the European Council with representatives of 
third States or international organisations or other personalities may be held 
in exceptional circumstances only, and with the prior agreement of the 
European Council, acting unanimously, on the initiative of the President of 
the European Council.119  
Consequently, the EU is defensive when it comes to any outside influence. Yet, 
because the EU does not strictly rule out the participation of third-country representatives 
at the Council on all occasions, the UK currently perceives a potential opportunity on an 
ad hoc basis.120 
C. THE EU’S STANCE  
Before the 2018 Munich Security Conference, former Permanent Representative of 
Italy to NATO, Stefano Stefanini, and German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger indicated that 
the UK’s military capacity equals about 25 to 30% of the EU’s total security and defense 
capacity. At the time, they argued that “it is too little for the UK to stand alone; it is too 
 
117 Council of the European Union. (2016). Comments on the Council’s Rules of Procedure European 
Council’s and Council’s Rules of Procedure.  
118 Santopinto, CDSP after Brexit, 21. 
119 General Secretariat of the Council, Rules of Procedure of the European Council (Brussels, 
Belgium: General Secretariat of the Council, 2009), 79, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/
files/docs/body/rules_of_procedure_of_the_council_en.pdf. 
120 Santopinto, CDSP after Brexit, 22. 
33 
much for the EU to do without it.”121 Nevertheless, the EU stance on a future CSDP 
partnership, according to Federico Santopinto, is vastly different from Britain’s and, “as 
far as the EU is concerned, existential in nature.”122 One of the issues is that the EU 
Member States cannot allow the UK to shape their common policies after Brexit.  
According to Ischinger and Stefanini, “The sphere of foreign policy and defense, 
including homeland and cybersecurity, will need to rely on strong and continuing EU-UK 
cooperation irrespective of Brexit. Trade can be transactional; security is not.”123 The key 
argument in offering such an exemption is based on the fact that the UK has a strong 
military, as well as great political influence globally.124  
The main issue in this regard is “that the UK seeks to be involved in the decision-
making process of the CSDP in one way or another.”125 In other words, the UK would 
have powers similar to those of EU member states in the CSDP. The EU has been fairly 
clear in its objection to this status. For example, “the European Parliament resolution on 
negotiations with the UK following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the 
EU,” concludes with the following statement: “a state withdrawing from the Union cannot 
enjoy similar benefits to those enjoyed by a Union Member State, and therefore announces 
that it will not consent to any agreement that would contradict this.”126 Both statements 
are clear, and the EU is not likely to deviate from this stance. In general, cherry-picking 
which EU policies to take part in by any third country is out of the question. In the event, 
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article 50 of the European Council, states that “A future partnership should respect the 
autonomy of the Union’s decision-making, taking into account that the UK will be a third 
country, and foresee appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of 
information, and cooperation mechanisms.”127  
At the Berlin Security Conference in November 2017, Michel Barnier drew five 
main conclusions regarding a post-Brexit UK-CSDP partnership:  
1. The UK defense minister will no longer take part in meetings of EU 
Defense Ministers; there will be no UK ambassador sitting on the 
Political and Security Committee.  
2. The UK can no longer be a framework nation: it will not be able to take 
command of EU–led operations or lead EU battlegroups.  
3. The UK will no longer be a member of the European Defence Agency 
or Europol.  
4. The UK will not be able to benefit from the European Defence Fund in 
the same way Member States will.  
5. The UK will no longer be involved in decision-making, nor in planning 
our defense and security instruments.128  
These conclusions have several consequences. At this moment, the Operation 
Headquarters of Operation Atlanta is based in Northwood (the UK), which, therefore, 
requires a transfer. Additionally, the Operational Command of Operation Althea currently 
held by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will have to be 
transferred. Because the position of DSACEUR is held by a British Officer. These rules 
apply during the transition period. According to Article 121 of the draft agreement on the 
withdrawal of the UK, “there shall be a transition or implementation period, which shall 
start on the date of entry into force of this Agreement and end on 31 December 2020.”129 
Consequently, the transition period will last from the 29th of March 2019 until the end of 
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December 2020. Article 124130 concerning specific arrangements relating to the European 
Union’s external action indicates that:  
During the transition period, the United Kingdom shall not provide 
commanders of civilian operations, heads of mission, operation 
commanders, or force commanders for missions or operations conducted 
under Articles 42, 43, and 44 TEU [Treaty on European Union], nor shall it 
provide the operational headquarters for such missions or operations or 
serve as framework nation for [European] Union battlegroups. During the 
transition period, the United Kingdom shall not provide the head of any 
operational actions under Article 28 TEU.131  
The European Parliament’s resolution on the framework of the future EU-UK 
relationship132 has reiterated the negotiation position of the EU. When it comes to the 
CSDP, the following statement indicates the limits, but also the possibilities for a post-
Brexit partnership:  
The European Parliament notes that, on common foreign and security 
policy, the UK as a third country will not be able to participate in the EU’s 
decision-making process and that EU common positions and actions can 
only be adopted by EU Member States; points out, however, that this does 
not exclude consultation mechanisms that would allow the UK to align with 
EU foreign policy positions.133  
The possibility of consultation mechanisms leaves the UK with some leeway to 
influence CSDP structures. According to the European Parliament, such a partnership 
would be possible under the current forms of an FPA.134 However, considering that the 
UK is requesting a partnership with scope that exceeds that of other third countries, this is 
unlikely to satisfy the UK. Adjusting the current mechanisms in place or creating an 
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entirely new mechanism for post-Brexit EU-UK CSDP cooperation, therefore, needs to be 
considered. As this research indicated, there are three tools for a future partnership, either 
based on concluding an FPA, ad hoc agreements, such as the PA, exchange of letters or 
Berlin Plus arrangements, and concluding a new and more ambitious framework. In any 
case, it should be taken into account that “Any future role will be that of a facilitator, rather 
than a leader.”135  
D. CONCLUSION 
Figure 5 shows that there is some room for negotiation regarding the signing of an 
enhanced FPA. The EU has argued in the past that the current form of FPAs could be 
changed to allow for deeper involvement of third countries. Nonetheless, it should be 
considered that this option would not be created solely to meet the UK’s demands. Instead, 
the creation of a new format would most likely apply to all third countries involved.  
 
Figure 5. The UK’s and EU’s stance toward future CSDP mission136 
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After Brexit, the UK will be considered as a third country in the eyes of the EU. 
Since the beginning it has become clear that it is possible for third countries to join CSDP 
missions and operations of the EU by means of concluding FPAs or PAs. The EU 
welcomes the UK’s post-Brexit CSDP involvement due to the UK’s military weight and 
diplomatic significance, allowing it to provide substantial amounts of expertise, troops, and 
hardware. Nonetheless, the UK’s call for a unique relationship that exceeds that of any 
other third country makes post-Brexit UK participation in CSDP missions and operations 
less straightforward that that of an EU member. Current means of joining CSDP missions 
and operations through FPAs and PAs strongly emphasize that third country contributions 
should always “be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU.”137 
Consequently, third countries are largely kept outside the decision-making procedures of 
missions and operations. The UK is unlikely to accept such a subordinate role within the 
CSDP. Therefore, allowing the UK to secure greater decision-making influence and control 
of missions than is normally granted to third country participation is essential for a future 
CSDP partnership. Close CSDP cooperation between the EU and the UK post-Brexit will 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE EU-UK SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP POST-BREXIT 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the possible effects of Brexit on the future 
security and defense relationship between the EU and the UK: first, by illustrating the 
possible alternative models for a security and defense partnership, and second, by offering 
recommendations for a possible post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership. Both 
parties will be affected by the Brexit vote. Thus, there is a vital need to find a new security 
and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe. At present, there is a shortage of 
sources that deal with the possible security and defense models for the future EU-UK 
partnership. As a result, the following research models are based on future trade models. 
There is a critical need for EU-UK cooperation in terms of security and defense 
after Brexit. Nonetheless, the EU will continue to outline its foreign, security and defense 
policies on its own. Furthermore, as of 31 October 2019, the UK has made the decision to 
remove themselves from current EU mechanisms. The lack of cooperation in justice and 
police affairs, intelligence exchanges, and as a result, the UK’s withdrawal from CSDP 
will not only damage its national security but will have huge economic costs.138  
The third-party agreements, such as Framework Participation Agreements and 
Administrative Arrangements which were ratified with Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, 
may not provide an adequate model for the future EU-UK security relations as the UK 
demands more privileged status.139 As mentioned earlier, both the EU and the UK share a 
common concern with regards to security and defense relations. On one hand, the UK relies 
on the EU for its strategic capabilities and political power. On the other hand, the UK 
proposed its interest several times to participate in EU security and defense policies. The 
UK will remain as important security player in Europe outside the EU through its 
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membership in international organizations such as NATO the UN Security Council.140  
Ultimately, the UK should focus on strengthening this role outside the EU. 
A. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE POST-BREXIT EU-UK SECURITY 
AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP 
Overall, the extent and degree of the UK’s security and defense cooperation with 
the EU as a privileged partner will be clarified in the “final status” of the EU-UK 
agreement. There are three possible alternatives for the UK. In the first case, the UK as a 
non-member state will agree to the EU’s foreign and security policy arrangements which 
will grant full participant rights. Alternatively, the UK may build a privileged partnership 
in specific areas in which bilateral interests are prone to be stable, yet the parties could 
pursue tactical bilateralism. Partnership through formal political dialogue arrangements 
seems to be the most advantageous for the UK. Lastly, the UK will be locked out and 
treated as a non-privileged state. Internal security issues will be dependent on the method 
of Europol and information sharing cooperation.  
The UK’s bilateral and trilateral relationships with current EU member states and 
states outside of Europe, will significantly be affected by Brexit. The future aim of these 
relationships should be focused on finding privileged partners for building bilateral or 
trilateral relations in the security and defense partnership outside the EU framework. 
Bilateral defense structures the UK established with EU member states exemplify this 
option. One of them is the Lancaster House treaties of 2010 between the UK and France 
which also established the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for crisis management.  
Finding a format for the future relationship involving the UK, France, and Germany 
will be a crucial task due to the political uncertainties that these states currently face at the 
present time. For example, France and Germany’s mutual interests on a specific future 
agenda for the EU could clash with the UK’s interests. Whitman argues “As the 
relationship between the UK, France, and Germany extends beyond EU issues (and with 
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existing collaboration on European and international security and global economic 
governance) a new trilateralism might be envisaged.”141  
Outside of the EU framework, while the Three may pursue a strong bilateral 
relationship, they will also face a dilemma in struggling to make their bilateral relations 
special. Pursuing privileged partnerships in which bilateral interests remain stable while 
pursuing tactical bilateralism if needed could be the strategy for the UK.142  
B. CIVILIAN POWER AND THE NECESSITY OF PESCO FUNDING UK’S 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES  
Since Brexit, France and Germany have redirected their attention to “permanent 
structured cooperation (PESCO) to increase their bilateral security and defense 
collaboration.”143 Since Brexit, the CSDP’s military capabilities have been decreasing. As 
a result, the EU could seek to phase out the CSDP and create a “civilian superpower” 
because, without the presence and contributions of the UK, the EU will have to adjust its 
goals and aims to its capacities.144 After the St. Malo agreement, despite the CSDP’s 
Franco-British collaboration, “the UK and (to some extent) France have lost interest in a 
‘Europe-puissance’.”145 In the post-Brexit partnership framework, the UK acknowledges 
that it could not play a leadership role in CSDP and also that it will lose its membership 
status in EDA in which the UK contributed with its military and defense-industrial 
capabilities. 
While EUGS promotes a comprehensive approach for future security and defense 
strategies for France and Germany, it also signals a transition to a ‘‘Civilian Power 
Europe.” From the German perspective, this transition suits its new leadership role in the 
economic and political aspects of this outlook. Also, Ham argues that “Without British 
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support, France is unable to instill Realpolitik in the EU’s security discourse, which is now 
dominated by debates on humanitarian issues, dealing with climate change and intensifying 
cultural dialogue as key EU foreign and security policies.”146  
After Brexit, France and Germany will likely redirect their attention to Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in order to increase their bilateral security and defense 
collaboration. With this mechanism, France and Germany would make the EU’s security 
goals much stronger before arriving at European Defense Union (EDU). Brexit encouraged 
both France and Germany to activate the PESCO mechanism for a European Defense 
Union to sustain close bilateral security and defense relations with the UK. Ham states, “it 
is in the UK’s declared interest that the EU does not slip into its comfort zone as a ‘civilian 
power’, but that the EU instead maintains a high level of defense cooperation, and at the 
same time remains open to flexible arrangements with third countries.”147 However, Ham 
states “PESCO is now considered possible (and even necessary) to compensate for the loss 
of Britain’s defense capabilities that were available to the CSDP.”148 New initiatives on 
PESCO may create a more ambitious vision for the European Defense Union. Ham argues 
that “The cold-turkey option (which assumes that Brexit will not be well managed and less 
than congenial) may apply to the first phase (one year or so) after Brexit.”149 
Brexit might transform the EU’s Political Union into a completely federal Europe 
including a stronger and recalibrated security and defense element. Ham assumes that 
“although the UK has certainly not been single-handedly responsible for blocking the 
development of a more solid CSDP, Brexit has allowed the CSDP to become fully and 
organically incorporated within the process of federalizing the EU.”150 However, 
Eurosceptic voices in the EU could oppose this federal end-goal. Thus, the so-called “small 
power EU” along with its military power after Brexit could reorganize itself by turning to 
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a federal Europe with a CSDP. This stronger security element could be the real solution to 
keep the U.S. and NATO in Europe.  
In terms of NATO and the UN, the EU and the UK could foster the implementation 
of EU-NATO cooperation to maintain peace and security. This cooperation should be 
backed by an EU-NATO Security Arrangement. In the absence of this arrangement, there 
would not be an exchange of important information and documents. Furthermore, the UK 
would also support the EU-NATO partnership through its membership in NATO with 
initiatives and working groups that deal with capability development, security and defense 
planning, and cyber-threats.151  
In sum, if the Brexit negotiation process is regulated well, the EU will confront 
existential choices. These choices would (1) follow the Civilian Europe path while 
disregarding the CSDP, opting for the United States of Europe through a European Defense 
Union, or (2) to seek a more flexible and close security and defense cooperation that 
includes the UK within NATO.152 This option for the EU harmonizes the federal European 
choice with a concrete CSDP/EDU to eliminate the risk of losing the U.S. and NATO. In 
this way, member states who traditionally held an Atlanticist view could grasp the CSDP/
EDU. 
C. PARTNERSHIP THROUGH FRAMEWORK PARTICIPATION 
AGREEMENT AND PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS 
After Brexit, both the EU and UK must seek to develop an aspiring and distinct 
security and defense partnership while recognizing the UK’s status as an individual player. 
The UK already is a key player and will continue to be one in EU international development 
assistance with its capable forces as a member of the UN Security Council and NATO. 
Willing member states would share their capabilities and military forces under the 
European Defense Agency using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). They 
also could benefit from PESCO for creating multinational forces similar to NATO or an 
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EU mission/operation. The CFSP and CSDP are intergovernmental and recognize the 
sovereignty of each member state in foreign and defense policy. Thus, there would be 
mechanisms involving the UK willingness, minus a veto, directly in the EU security and 
defense matters with regards to the independence of the UK and the EU.  
According to Blunt, mechanisms for the efficient arrangements for the EU-UK 
cooperation in security and defense after Brexit rest on the following formulas; “first, an 
Enhanced Framework Participation Agreement, second, Permanent Observer Status for the 
UK in the Political and Security Committee, and third, regular high-level political 
dialogue.”153 
When they agree on the conditions through framework agreements, non-EU 
countries could participate in case-by-case CSDP missions and operations. Several 
countries including Norway, Turkey, Canada, Serbia, and Ukraine have framework 
agreements in place. In addition to these, the U.S. also signed a Framework Agreement to 
attend crisis management operations led by the EU in May 2011. However, Framework 
Participation Agreements only accommodate controlled participation in the formulation 
and planning stages as illustrated in Table 1.  
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Table 1. The UK’s post-transition security and defense options154 
 
 
Through this partnership, countries decide on the scope and intensity of their 
relations with NATO, and through bilateral partnership documents, they express their aims 
within this bilateral cooperation. These established documents are including the 
“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP); Individual Partnership and 
Action Plan (IPAP); [and] Annual National Programme (ANP).”155 In 2014, the EOP was 
established at the Wales Summit to enhance NATO’s cooperation with partner states 
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“which are eligible to have a more exclusive, tailor-made relationship with the 
Alliance.”156 Additionally, in the following years, the Enhanced Opportunities Partners 
(EOP) could broaden its scope by adding other qualified partners who are interested in 
developing a partnership and contributing new capabilities. NATO’s close cooperation 
“with five non-member allies such as Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden 
known as ‘Enhanced Opportunity’ partners may be regarded as a role model for the future 
EU-UK cooperation.”157  This cooperation between the EU and UK could be beneficial 
while considering possible models for political discussion and support after Brexit.158 
Blunt lists additional elements to foster strong and reliable institutional ties between the 
EU and the UK such as:  
An automatic right of first refusal to participate in initiatives and a defined 
role in development of mission concept and purpose through PSC and 
CMPD consultation. The possibility of seconding national experts to 
relevant directorates of the EEAS and relevant committees. Guaranteed 
inclusion in force generation conferences and committee of contributors. 
The possibility of hosting Operating  Headquarters (the UK could retain 
Northwood for ATALANTA and put Northwood or other centres at the 
disposal of future operations). An agreement for the sharing of confidential 
intelligence and planning documents, as the U.S. has with the EU.159  
Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) have been used by non-EU states in 
attending CSDP missions; however, non-EU states cannot participate in processes such as 
organization, preparation, or commanding. After Brexit, the UK could suggest contributing 
to CSDP missions/operations with its vital capacities including strategic airlift or ISR. 
Also, for the future EU-UK security and defense partnership, arrangements on sharing 
intelligence will be important because of the UK’s capacities and contributions in this area. 
Similarly, due to the UK’s high-quality personnel capacities, its involvement in the civilian 
CSDP missions will be crucial for the EU. The UK’s participation in the EU battlegroups 
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should also be covered in such an agreement. Therefore, the EU could create a new FPA 
for a third-party country with vital strategic importance for CSDP.160 
Since 2004, the UK has had a vital influence with regards to the European Defense 
Agency (EDA). For a country to become a participant of the EDA, that country must be a 
member of the EU. However, non-EU countries could join the EDA through 
Administrative Arrangements. For example, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Serbia 
have signed the Administrative Arrangements to this end. Administrative Arrangements 
enable countries’ participation in the interaction process, projects, and voluntary personnel 
contributions.161 However, these arrangements provide no rights to voting and automatic 
presence at any meeting. Therefore, the EU would need to reform a new approach for non-
EU states who are interested in security and defense partnerships with high-level 
commitments.162 These countries might participate in missions/operations and 
development processes and also EDF acts with the assumption of making financial 
contributions to the fund.163 
For the future dialogue and close coordination of the security and defense issues, 
the UK could obtain a permanent observer status in the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC). The observer status would have detailed procedures and rules in terms of speaking 
rights and rights on agendas. The following cases should be rules: how the UK’s positions 
will be recorded in terms of timing and documents as well as any time a UK representative 
is not present during discussions. Through a special partnership treaty governing the 
observer status of the UK, the speaking right for the UK’s representative should be given 
in discussions. This rule would not open doors for other third countries such as candidates 
while preparing the treaty.164 
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The UK’s government has declared its interest in participating specific European 
programs such as Horizon 2020 because making an appropriate contribution to these 
programs was seen reasonable in post-Brexit in terms of science and innovation. The 
Withdrawal Agreement allows this cooperation in European programs along with funding 
until the end of 2020 and in the post-Brexit era. So, negotiations would also include the 
future financing of these programs and arrangements.  
D. THE UK AS AN INTEGRATED PLAYER, ASSOCIATED PARTNER, OR 
DETACHED OBSERVER 
As noted, the UK will not participate of the Foreign Affairs Council, European 
Council, and Political and Security Committee after Brexit. However, the UK can still 
participate in the EU’s security and defense structure with a special status under the form 
of EU+1 model.165 Such an Integrated player model assumes that in terms of CSDP, while 
the UK remains outside the EU, it would stay inside the CSDP by sustaining its existing 
commitments to present civilian and military arrangements. Besides, the UK would also 
continue its commitments in terms of Battlegroups as deployable forces. Moreover, the UK 
would continue to participate on a case-by-case project by holding an associate 
membership status in the EDA. Furthermore, the UK would hold an observer status on the 
Agency’s Steering Board while contributing to the EDA budget.”166 
The associated partner model demonstrates much looser EU-UK security and 
defense relationship than the integrated player model. This security and defense partnership 
would imitate the existing model of the EU and Norway. In this model, there would be two 
agreements. One, where the UK supports the EU’s foreign policy actions, sanctions, and 
statements from the European Union, and two, while still outside the military planning in 
the EU’s structures, the UK would decide to join implementation aspects. For this, the UK 
could sign a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) in every CSDP mission they wish 
to join. Moreover, the UK may sustain its ongoing presence in an EU Battlegroup. 
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Nevertheless, in the Associated Partner model, the UK would have no affect over the 
development of EU foreign, security, and defense policies.167 
In the Detached observer model, the UK will be separated both politically and 
organizationally from the EU’s foreign, security, and defense policies. Yet, the UK might 
prefer privileged bilateral relationships with EU member states. By doing so, the UK would 
use this as an advantage to control the EU’s foreign, security, and defense policy other than 
seeking this aim with third party arrangements. While this model gives the UK the most 
independence, the UK’s level of influence will shrink automatically in the EU’s security 
and defense policy.168 In terms of CSDP, the UK might imitate the model of EU-US 
practice. While the U.S. did not participate in CSDP military missions, the U.S. joined “in 
civilian CSDP missions on a case-by-case basis via a framework agreement on crisis 
management operations signed in 2011.”169  
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Ultimately, options suggested by Mölling, Giegerich, and Whitman overlap in 
some ways. For example, through FPAs, the UK could continue to participate in case-by-
case operations or missions in the CSDP. However, this option comes with some 
drawbacks in that the UK would not enjoy voting rights, automatic presence at meetings, 
or any leadership role in decision-making processes. The UK has expressed its intention as 
contradictory to this type of relationship. Also, establishing a bilateral/trilateral or 
multilateral cooperation between interested EU member states and the UK is another 
option. The UK could form privileged relationships with some EU member states such as 
Germany, France, or Poland. This thesis, however, argues that the most viable option for 
the EU and UK’s security and defense relationship is that the UK create bilateral/trilateral 
or multilateral partnership with willing EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO 
cooperation. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE POST-BREXIT EU-UK SECURITY 
AND DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP 
Brexit should represent an opportunity for the EU to rethink its integration process. 
If the European Defense Fund (EDF) is the EU’s vital tool to advocate a security defense 
integration process, the EDF rule of law and budget should be secured by the EP. Whether 
or not the EU rebuilds its independence with the UK, the EU needs to define the future 
security and defense partnership with the UK.  
The EU should deliberate on the UK’s post-Brexit international posture before 
making final arrangements on the security and defense partnership, especially in the areas 
of CFSP and CSDP. Currently, the EU’s wait and see strategy should transform to a more 
flexible one by not only obtaining the UK’s interest but maintaining it as well. The future 
EU-UK partnership must be changeable, aiming to see the behaviors of each other and 
agree to rely on commitments. For this reason, the EU should not put a harsh treaty in 
security and defense areas.  
The EU and the UK should create a framework for dialogue which is both formal 
and informal. The EU and the UK might draft an FPA that gives enough room for both 
parties by stating the terms and level of association of the UK to the individual operations. 
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The UK’s cooperation through PESCO or EDA should be limited before proving itself in 
terms of willingness and behavior in the objectives of these policies. The level of 
cooperation would be changed during time.171 
The EU and the UK should continue to work through NATO as a common dialogue 
platform to ensure the security of the European continent. The EU could replicate the 
United States’ relation with ‘Enhanced Opportunity’ partners to build new security and 
defense relations. The UK would establish bilateral/trilateral or multilateral relationships 
with willing and interested member states.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, declarations and agreements were analyzed to reveal the EU’s 
responses to the UK’s demand on establishing Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense 
partnership. This chapter provided an overview of the negotiation process on specific 
security and defense areas, to include  creating a Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense 
partnership For this reason, this chapter was called Alternative Models for Post-Brexit EU-
UK Security and Defense partnership and has presented several options for the EU-UK in 
terms of creating a post-Brexit partnership. Finally, recommendations for establishing 
Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been given as guidance for the 
incomplete process between the EU and the UK. This study envisages that the most viable 
option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create 
bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with EU member states while also supporting 
EU-NATO cooperation. If both the EU and the UK continually express their red lines, 
which could slow down the process, this type of relationship could serve as a pragmatic 
option in dealing with the security of the European continent. 
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Brexit should represent an opportunity for the EU to rethink its integration process. 
The EU should deliberate on the UK’s post-Brexit international posture before making 
final arrangements on the security and defense EU-UK partnership, especially in the areas 
of CFSP and CSDP. The EU and the UK should continue to work through NATO as a 
common dialogue platform to ensure the security of the European continent. Given the 
incomplete negotiating process between the EU and the UK, creating bilateral, trilateral, 
or multilateral partnerships with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO 
cooperation could be a viable option. 
Overall, re-consideration of the present security and foreign policy concerning 
Brexit could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security and foreign policy involving 
the UK in precise areas. From the EU’s perspective, Lain and Nouwens argue that EU 
member states can benefit from the security point of view by the British exit.172 They hold 
that without the UK’s traditional opposition to more integration in defense and security 
policy, EU member states could take more initiatives more easily and cooperatively 
without the blocking of the UK. While France is more interested in counter-terrorism 
arrangements and involved in missions in line with its national interests, Germany has 
tended to harmonize with the EU defense policies.173 In addition to these threat 
assumptions, the EU could also reassess its existing CSDP arrangements. As an example, 
in 2016, the Paris and Brussels attacks showed deficiencies in these existing frameworks 
in terms of processing and using intelligence.174 The UK may choose to form bilateral, 
trilateral, and multilateral alliances with EU member states while also supporting EU-
NATO cooperation. In this cooperation on security and defense, the UK will have the 
opportunity to protect its national interests and to strengthen its position in the European 
and global arenas.  
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In this respect, the United States has always encouraged European Union states to 
boost their efforts for the security of their continent. Even if NATO is a framework for 
trans-Atlantic defense cooperation, U.S. administrations have supported the EU in 
organizing its Security and Defense Policy if the policies do not contradict those of  NATO. 
Thus, the United States also supports the new post-Brexit security and defense partnership 
involving the EU and the UK for three reasons.175 
First, to maintain a security balance, the United States endorses the 2 percent of 
GDP that the UK has contributed in part to a NATO-relevant security partnership. The UK 
and France are two states with strong defense capabilities and the UK (like all NATO Allies 
except Iceland) pledged to spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense measures. The 
UK’s leaders have pushed other EU member states to contribute more. However, the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU will only further decrease the EU’s defense capacities. 
The second reason is that the United States relies on its traditional ally and special 
partner in the EU defense coordination. If the United States does not perceive the EU 
defense structures as undermining the U.S. relationship with Europe and NATO, UK 
governments have consistently preserved the importance of NATO while cooperating in 
defense issues to strengthen the European Union forces.  
Third, the UK also cooperated willingly and ably with the United States both in the 
2003 invasion of Iraq through a coalition of the willing and the 2001 occupation of 
Afghanistan. However, coordination in the Middle East is a complex process through the 
EU, the UK, or NATO. Thus, there is a need for broader cooperation between the EU, the 
UK, and NATO. If the UK cooperatively acts with the EU, it can easily access broader 
markets and have a larger budget and political voice.176 While pursuing EU interests, the 
UK’s foreign policy is referred to as soft power. Nevertheless, with the decision of the UK 
to leave the EU, the credibility of EU foreign policy in the Middle East would be decreased. 
The EU’s voice will be less influential in the Middle East without the UK’s security and 
defense capacities and experience in foreign policy. Ultimately, the United States seeks a 
 
175 Miller Vaughne, “Leaving the EU,” House of Commons 13, no. 42 (2013): 8. 
176 Vaughne, 83. 
55 
partnership between the UK and the EU to avoid confrontation with the EU, a more likely 
occurrence with the absence of Britain, one of the oldest U.S. allies.  
The vital need for continued security and defense cooperation between London and 
Brussels was recognized in the UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
and the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy by focusing on the shared threats.177 UK leaders argue 
that without a new security treaty ensuring the post-Brexit security relations, the EU-UK 
cooperation on confronting terrorism and criminal issues will lack the present-day 
capabilities.  
In the White Paper, the UK government examined the UK’s position in relation to 
the EU as follows:   
It has worked with all Member States to develop a significant suite of tools 
that supports the UK’s and the EU’s combined operational capabilities and 
helps keep citizens safe. ... The UK will no longer be part of the EU’s 
common policies on foreign, defence, security, justice, and home affairs. 
Instead, the Government is proposing a new security partnership that 
maintains close cooperation because as the world continues to change, so 
too do the threats the UK and the EU both face.178 
For these purposes, the UK government envisioned a new security partnership 
based on the following terms and conditions: 
One, sustainment of capabilities of both parties to secure citizens’ lives and 
requiring police to reveal sensitive data and information to confront 
dangerous criminals and terrorists. Two, joining the agencies such as 
Europol and Eurojust to share information. Three, decide on the 
coordination of foreign policy, defense, and development areas to confront 
international challenges and ensuring the deployment of the UK’s important 
assets, intelligence, and capabilities for the European values. Four, ensure a 
joint capability development which composed of operational effectiveness 
of militaries and increasing competitiveness of the European defense 
industry to face the global challenges. Lastly, developing wider cooperation 
to confront illegal migration and through strategic dialogue, cooperating on 
 
177 Great Britain et al., National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A 
Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom., 2015. 
178 Great Britain and Department for Exiting the European Union, The Future Relationship between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union, 2018, 9, https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/
vdc_100062857375.0x000001. 
56 
the issues of cybersecurity and terrorism, health security, and civil 
protection.179  
The future EU-UK security partnership will have to secure the citizens of both the 
EU and the UK. Thus, there should be a comprehensive and single security partnership to 
tackle terrorism threats, instabilities in the neighborhood, managing migration, and using 
data. To deliver the visions mentioned earlier, the security partnership should align with 
the following objectives: 
be notified by the shared security context; conserve the law and cooperation 
capabilities in criminal areas through sharing the sensitive data and 
information and ensure the cooperation in fighting terrorism through the 
Europol; continue cooperation on foreign policy, defence, and 
development, including consultation on the global challenges that the UK 
and the EU face, coordination where it is more effective to work side-by-
side, and capability development to deliver the means to tackle current and 
future threats; and joint action on wider security areas such as illegal 
migration, cybersecurity, terrorism, civil protection, and health security.180  
The White Paper acknowledges that “the world is becoming more complex and 
volatile. These complex and overlapping challenges are likely to remain security priorities 
for the UK and the EU over the next decade. To respond effectively will require a 
transformative approach, using the widest possible range of capabilities at the disposal of 
the UK and the EU.”181  
The transition period aims to let citizens and businesses in Britain maintain the 
benefits negotiated by the EU for its members. During this period, the UK must comply 
with the European Union treaties. Also, it will pay its budgetary contributions to the EU. 
Yet, participation in the decision-making processes and political representation in the EU 
were not granted to the UK as a third country.182   
To begin with, the participation of third countries in CSDP institutional structures 
is a difficult task; if the UK is granted many privileges, such as having power and voting 
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rights in projects or future strategic plans, other countries in the same position (non-EU 
European members of NATO) such as Turkey and Norway will demand the same rights.  
The EU’s Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) are mentioned in the 
Withdrawal agreement for the involvement of non-EU countries in the CSDP’s civilian 
and military missions and operations. Presently, 18 FPAs (one of them was with the US) 
have been signed. However, FPAs do not assure a guarantee of involvement in the 
operations. Third countries can also participate through Battlegroups without a position as 
a framework nation. In addition to the Framework Participation Agreements, 
Administrative Arrangements (AA) also let the European Defense Agency (EDA) 
cooperate with third countries. Nevertheless, these conditions will not suit the UK if it 
seeks a more special relationship. The EU’s strategy on this issue is to leave the door open 
for possible future projects with the UK and also to define a more precise agreement in 
which involvement of the UK in activities is set.183 
The possible future of the UK’s participation in the EU’s PESCO or EDF remains 
to be seen. Yet, the possible contributions to missions and operations as a third country 
were not envisioned within the European Union Treaties. Santopinto argues that “the 
conditions for third countries to access the EU’s decision-making procedures may well be 
tougher than those of NATO.”184 so that, “no third country may refer matters to the 
European Council.”185 Despite all the problems that the UK faces in this time of 
uncertainties, various solutions are under consideration. 
Following Britain’s vote to leave the EU, both the UK and the EU have sought 
ways to build a new security and defense partnership. The White Paper, The Future 
Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union, reflects the UK’s 
commitment to such a partnership and acknowledges the common threats that both parties 
face. Also, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, which establishes a transition period until 
the end of 2020, outlines the proposed partnership with the UK.  
 
183 Santopinto, 23. 
184 Santopinto, 21. 
185 Santopinto, 146. 
58 
From the EU’s side, there have been several attempts to enhance European security, 
including the establishment of the CSDP, the EDA, the EDF, PESCO, and close 
cooperation with NATO. Also, despite the fact that is timing and publication were 
overshadowed by the Brexit vote, the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 articulated 
the EU’s new strategic goals. However, these efforts also included some limitations.  
From the UK’s side, its intention to enhance the EU’s autonomous decision-making 
along with its military capabilities in the St. Malo Declaration was remarkable. On the one 
hand, the UK has contributed to CSDP missions and operations in terms of finance, military 
equipment, expertise, and personnel. However, the UK, especially in military operations, 
limits some aspects of CSDP by opposing the expansion of the EDA and the creation of a 
permanent EU military operational headquarters. Rather, it has chosen to participate in 
capacity-building projects based on civilian missions. On the other hand, both parties 
acknowledge the importance of NATO in their security and defense relations. Thus, NATO 
could act as a bridge between the EU and the UK in a post-Brexit security and defense 
partnership if both the EU and the UK attach an essential role to NATO for collective 
defense.  
The future position of the UK in world affairs will also have an impact on the EU. 
Thus, there is a vital need to develop a new security and defense partnership to secure the 
borders of Europe if reducing cooperation will not be a logical or intended option for both 
parties.  
Alternative models for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have 
been presented in this thesis. These include partnership through bilateralism and 
trilateralism, civilian power Europe-PESCO, partnership through a Framework 
Participation Agreement and Permanent Observer Status, and the UK as an integrated 
player-associated partner, or detached Observer. 
It is important to stress that signing an FPA is a minimum criterion for a non-
member state’s participation in EU-led missions and operations. The UK’s possible 
participation formula would rely on signing an FPA as a detached observer. These options 
could also serve as guidance for other non-EU countries such as Turkey that are interested 
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in establishing security and defense partnerships with the EU. This thesis concludes that 
the most adventurous option for the future EU-UK security and defense relationship would 
provide for the UK establishing bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral partnerships with 
privileged partners such as France, Germany, or Poland while also supporting close and 
ambitious EU-NATO cooperation.  
After Brexit, the UK will be considered a third country in the eyes of the EU. 
According to EU policy, third countries can join CSDP missions and operations of the EU 
through FPAs or PAs. Almost every CSDP mission and operation initiated by the EU thus 
far has involved third countries. Despite marginal UK contributions to CSDP missions and 
operations in recent years, the UK is said to be committed to continuing its involvement in 
the CSDP. The EU welcomes post-Brexit CSDP involvement due to the UK’s military 
weight and diplomatic significance, allowing it to provide substantial combinations of 
expertise, troops, and hardware. Nonetheless, the UK’s call for a unique relationship that 
exceeds that of any other third country makes post-Brexit participation in CSDP missions 
and operations exceptionally complex. Current means of joining CSDP missions and 
operations through FPAs and PAs strongly emphasize that third country contributions 
should always be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU.  
Consequently, third countries are largely kept outside the decision-making 
procedures of missions and operations. The UK is unlikely to accept such a subordinate 
role in the CSDP. Therefore, determining whether the UK will be able to secure greater 
decision-making influence and control over missions and operations than is normally 
granted to third-country participation is essential for a future CSDP partnership. Given the 
EU’s stance toward a post-Brexit CSDP framework, the UK will not have a voice in the 
decision-making, i.e., it will lose its veto power. Moreover, the EU is determined not to 
disrupt the EU’s relationship with other third countries. Hence, a post-Brexit CSDP 
partnership is unlikely to be truly “special.” 
Therefore, any future role in CSDP missions and operations by the UK will be that 
of a facilitator rather than a leader. Current frameworks to join CSDP missions and 
operations through concluding an FPA or PA are likely to result in limited UK involvement 
in the CSDP post-Brexit. This research has shown that an enhanced FPA would allow the 
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UK to continue to participate in CSDP missions and operations post-Brexit in a manner 
deemed more fitting. The EU has indicated its interests in creating a mechanism for closer 
and more constant coordination with third countries involved in CSDP missions and 
operations. This research suggests reviewing in greater depth and detail the EU’s current 
CSDP partnership arrangements. There are several ways for the UK and other third 
countries to obtain greater influence in CSDP missions and operations than is granted to 
them today.  
In this regard, third countries such as the UK could be granted greater influence and 
access to the decision-making process, depending on the political and strategic importance 
of a specific third country, as well as its commitment and involvement in CSDP missions 
and operations. Additionally, the current format of the CoC lacks political influence and 
significance. By upgrading the CoC to meet at a more senior level, third countries could be 
able to secure greater influence over CSDP missions and operations. Moreover, the UK 
could try to seek permanent observer status in the PSC. However, considering the EU’s 
current reluctance to accept this idea, this option seems unlikely to succeed. Nonetheless, 
the EU has indicated its willingness to seek specific dialogue with the UK in CSDP matters 
after Brexit. In this regard, the UK could negotiate regular consultations at the ministerial 
and strategic level without a formal decision-making role.  
In general, the EU’s willingness to grant third countries more influence will always 
be limited, due to its sacrosanct decision-making autonomy. Close CSDP cooperation 
between the EU and the UK post-Brexit will therefore depend on future negotiations, and 
the EU’s willingness to reform current CSDP frameworks. By doing so, the EU could 
benefit from the British exit without the UK’s traditional opposition to more integration in 
defense and security policy, and this could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security 
and foreign policy involving the UK in precise areas. Also, the UK would have the 
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